Why married women leave their households and enter paid employment is central to the history of the labor force. The proportion of married women engaged in paid work in the United States increased more than tenfold during the past century, from less than 5% in 1890 to more than 60%! Much of the increased employment occurred in the years after 1940, and the 1940's mark an apparent break with the past in terms of women's work. The participation rate in 1940 of white married women 35 to 44 years old was 13.8% but was 25,3% in 1950, and 
Long-Run Changes in Women's Employment
Over the long run, married women joined the paid labor force because of a series of changes affecting the nature of work (Goldin 1983 (Goldin , 1990 ). Primary among these was the rise of the clerical and professional sectors and the increased education of women at the beginning of the twentieth century. Reinforcing this movement were secularly declining fertility rates, laborsaving advances in household production, declining hours of work, and rising real wages for all Americans. The end result stemmed, then, from two sets of variables: cohort factors and contemporaneous (or period) effects. Advances in education, altered fertility patterns, and 'Although one can quibble with the accuracy of the data for the earliest date (Goldin 1986 (Goldin , 1990 , an extensive movement of adult women out of the home and into the paid labor force is undeniable. Various adjustments affect primarily the paid labor of women within the home and on family farms, not their paid employment in the modern sector. I changed socialization of young women are cohort factors, which affect particular birth cohorts without necessarily influencing the entire society and economy. Changes in the sectorai distribution of labor, the earnings of families, unemployment, hours of work, urbanization, and the wages offered women workers are often contemporaneous factors, which affect all cohorts at a particular date in history.
Various pooled cross-section, time-series models have been estimated to separate these various effects. Cohort-specific factors, in one such study, account for about one-third or more of the total change over time (Goldin 1983 (Goldin , 1990 ; see also Ward 1984, 1985) . If the models used in these studies are correct representations of the complex forces that resulted in the rise of paid women's work, the large increase in adult women's participation in the 1950's had roots in an earlier era. To understand why women participated in the 1950's requires knowledge of changes in the lives of these women some thirty years before. The observed increase in the 1950's was, in some sense, the tip of an iceberg. Much of the large increase was due to contemporaneous factors -the heightened post-war demand for labor, the increase in real wages of women, and the decrease in unemployment. But many of the factors were hidden from view.
Several factors, however, delayed the increased labor force participation of women, particularly older married women. The Depression was a major setback for married women.
"Marriage bars" --the stated policies of firms, school districts, governments, and other institutions not to hire married women and to fire single women upon marriage -were instituted long before the I 930's but were expanded during the Depression as a means of rationing employment in a "fair" manner. There is some evidence that the bars delayed the increase in adult women's employment (see Goldin 1988) . The bars vanished sometime after the early 1940's and by the 1950's were rarely encountered.
World War II and the Rise of Married Women's Work
The various explanations offered for the rise of married women's paid employment still leave room for the impact of cataclysmic and unique events, such as World War II. Possible roles for World War II can be found on both the supply and demand sides of the market.
Women were drawn into the war-time economy through a variety of mechanisms. For some, increased wages, in general and specifically for women, were the main factor.2 A husband's absence meant a wife had less to do in the home, and patriotic duty was reason enough for others to join the war effort. Once in the labor market, various factors led women to remain employed.
On the supply side are various investments women made during the war, such as in job training and alternative housekeeping arrangements, that decreased the costs and increased the gains to post-war work. Other factors, still dimly understood, also operated to entice working women to remain in the labor force (see Goldin 1989, Smith and Ward 1984) . Some might concern norms against a woman working by society or by her husband. As John Durand remarked when the impact of wartime employment was still uncertain, "It is not likely that the increase during the war period will be a complete exception to the rule . . . that a generation of women which once adopts a greater degree of participation in gainful employment tends to retain that characteristic throughout its potential working life" (Durand 1948, p. 168) .
On the demand side, the war may have demonstrated to employers that women workers could function well in jobs that had previously been male domains. In fact, the ratio of female to male hourly wages in manufacturing continued to rise to 1948, "suggesting that factories which had overcome traditional stereotypes about the unsuitability of women were trying to keep women just as they were leaving the labor force" (Campbell 1984, p. 136) . hourly earnings of female manufacturing workers across 25 industries rose relative to that for male workers from 1943 to 1948 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975) and the earnings premium for war-related over consumer-related manufacturing was between 25% and 45% in 1944/45, depending on the war production area (U.S. Department of Labor 1946, p. 44).
There is substantial evidence that a pervasive ideology inhibited work for married women prior to 1950. And if the impediments to economic change were primarily ideological, then only a major break with the past, such as that effected by war, could have redefined economic roles. Many historians, including William Chafe, have concluded that World War II was that "watershed event." To Chafe, World War II "radically transformed the economic outlook of women" with an impact greater than even "the implementation of a well-developed ideology" (Chafe 1972, pp. 195, 135) .
Until recently, Chafe's view was well accepted. It accorded with the timing of the increase in women's work and with the sense of those who lived through the 1940's that something fundamental changed in American society. In the past decade, however, a revisionist literature has emerged discounting the importance of World War II in inexorably altering the lives of American women (Anderson 1981 , Campbell 1984 , Milkman 1987 .
American patriotism and inflated female wages during the war induced many women to enter the labor force, but they were not, according to this new literature, tQ become permanent participants. According to Campbell, "It is difficult to argue that World War II, in itself, constituted a watershed in the experience of American women," (1984, p. 236) . Many of the jobs women were offered during the war -Rosie the Riveter's is the perfect illustration --were taken away from them at its conclusion and were not in sectors women had previously shown a desire to enter. Women had not been craft workers before the war and had been leaving the manufacturing sector for clerical, sales, and professional jobs ever since the early twentieth century. The rhetoric of wartime mobilization led many to believe there was real change, when in actuality, according to this new interpretation, there was none. Reinforcing the revisionist view on the role of World War II are the findings, summarized above, on secular changes in the evolution of the female labor force.
The hypothesis that World War II was a significant factor in the rise of women's work has been tested in a time-series and cross-section model, by the inclusion of a single dummy variable for 1950 (Goldin 1990) . The coefficient on the dummy variable was small and not significant in all estimations.3 The method used was dictated by the available data, which are decadal rather than annual. The difficult question of whether the war had a residual impact, apart from reducing the Depression's high unemployment and increasing the wages of Americans, may be impossible to answer with these data The strongest conclusion one can draw from past analyses, then, is that World War II, by itself, had a small, possibly negligible, positive impact. The large change in participation from 1940 to 1950 seems to have been due to the indirect effect of the war on the economy and to the aging of cohorts ripe for labor force participation.
But even though the conclusion is fully consistent with an emerging historical literature, the data available may be insufficient to account for this far-reaching event. Had the data been annual, rather than decadal, the precise role of the war could have been assessed, and its impact on various cohorts could have been traced.4
I have recently found a data set that contains retrospective work histories for 4,350 women, working full-time for at least one month in 1950, and that has most of the information ' The model contains 37 observations, one for each cohort alive in each census year. When fulltime female wages are included in the model (as well as education, unemployment, the sectoral distribution of the work force, and fertility, among other factors), the labor force participation rate increased by 0.0261 percentage points due to the "war dummy" (around a mean of 0.22). When female earnings are excluded, the war has no effect.
See, for example, the econometric techniques used by Joshi, Layard, and Owen (1985) on British data and Ward (1984, 1985) on U.S. data to deal with the problem of serial correlation in a pooled cross-section, time-series analysis of annual data. Joshi at al. include a set of cohort dummies in a first-stage regression to explain within-cohort effects, and then use the cohort dummies in a second-stage regression to explain across-cohort differences. Smith and Ward estimate a similar first-stage equation in first-difference form from which they calculate cohort fixed-effects. These are then used in a second-stage regression to estimate across-cohort differences.
In their second-stage equation, Joshi et al. (1985, table 9 ) test whether cohorts of British women who were 20 to 29 years during World War II had changed labor force participation. "The Second World War enormously increased women's participation in all kinds of work [in Britain].. . . The experience of warwork led many women (especially in their twenties) to acquire skills they would not otherwise have acquired. This," they hypothesize, "must have made many of them more willing to work later" (p. S168). They find a small, positive impact of the war, but do not discuss the finding. The coded schedules summarize much of the data in the original surveys, and the information they contain can be grouped in two categories: retrospective and contemporaneous variables. Among the retrospective variables are: the occupation and industry of work (if the The original Palmer study also surveyed over 9,000 men, and the coded schedules for both men and women will be archived at Temple University Urban Archives in the papers of Gladys Palmer. See also Palmer (1954) .
• Women's Bureau Special Bulletin No. 20 did not list the official name of the census report but it seems likely that it was the Monthly Report on the Labor Force, a precursor of the Current Population Survey.
' The Palmer Survey, funded in part by the U.S. Air Force, was intended to provide the Air Force with information about geographic mobility across labor markets. Six cities were selected for study: two in the East (New Haven, Philadelphia), two in the Mid West (Chicago, St. Paul), and two in the West (Los Angeles, San Francisco). The title of the published study was Labor Mobility in Six Cities (Palmer 1954) . Curiously, the final report did not investigate the role of World War II in the lives of American In sum, among married white women who were employed in 1950, fully half were employed in 1940. The war was associated with a large increase in employment, but it was smaller than that occurring from 1944 to 1950, which was 33% of the eventual 1950 labor force.
Fully 26% of the 1950 participants were never employed during 1940 to 1944. Table 1 summarizes the data for the 35 to 64 year old age group and for two subsets.
Another important feature of these retrospective work histories is the remarkable persistence of women in the work force. Summary data, from the coded forms for the Palmer Survey, on total months worked from January 1940 to December 1949, are given in Table 2 . table) . Only 5% were employed fewer than 6 years.
Also revealed in Table 2 is that 52% of those who entered the labor force by 1944 accumulated 7 or more years of work experience over the decade. Only 12.5% had less than 5 years of work experience. The only reasonable inference to be drawn is that the majority of these women were continual participants from the time they entered the work force until 1950.
Also consistent with this view is that the majority of those not employed in 1940 and 1944, yet who were working in 1949, had been employed For rather short durations during the 1940's.
Almost 94% of this group had worked less than 5 years.
Because a large fraction of those working in 1950 were also employed in 1940, and had been continuously employed during the decade, the increase in the participation rate over the decade --nearly a doubling among most of the age groups and cohorts -must have come about by the entrance of women who had not been in the labor force in recent years.9 The main inference from Table 2 is that married women who were 35 to 64 years old (and employed) in 1950 did not transit in and out of the labor force with much rapidity even during the 1940's. A slight qualification to this statement will be made concerning the participation of a young group of married women just after Pearl Harbor.
Persistence has been recently discovered in data for employed women in the period prior to 1940 (001dm 1989, 1990 ) and after 1950 (Smith and Ward 1984) . Married and adult women once in the labor market tend not to leave. Although the data in Table 2 demonstrate One possible problem is that the inference comes from the aggregate labor force participation rate among white married women in the cohorts considered. The Palmer Survey data, however, do not give the length of time a woman was married, just whether she was married in 1950. It is assumed, therefore, that a very large fraction of women who were married by 1950 and 45 to 54 years old in 1950 were also married in 1940 when they were 35 to 44 years old. The same inference would be more troublesome for the younger group. persistence for women employed by 1950, the question is whether this was also true of all women in the 1940's.
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The data in Tables 1 and 2 The primary reason for constructing the tree diagrams in Table 3 Table 3 , that women of all marital statuses who were 20 to 44 years old in 1944, had a persistence rate of more than 80% from 1942 to 1944. The war years, however, do appear peculiar with regard to persistence of women workers.
Of greater interest is how women working in 1944, but out of the labor force on the eve of World War II, responded at the war's conclusion. These may be called the "Rosies" of the war effort and are contained in the " Out-In" branch, from 1942 to 1944 . In 1944 contained 45% of married women workers 20 to 44 years old (but 34% of all women workers Other possible biases may stem from the fact that the women in the Palmer Survey were all residents of large cities, while the data in the census are a national sample. 11 20 to 44 years old). Part of the reason the new entrants were such a large proportion of all working married women is that a large fraction left the labor force after Pearl Harbor, although it is also true that the entry rate among those "Out" in 1942 (12%) is higher than in 1944 (8%).
Of the war-time entrants, only 53% of the marned women remained employed to 1950 (64% of women of all marital statuses did). The "Rosies" of 1944 composed 22% of the eventual 1950 employment among married women, but, at that time, they were barely half their original number.12 Rosie and her compatriots did not remain in the post-war labor force to the degree entrants had in normal times.
Aspects of the exodus are well known. Many women were forced out of high-paying jobs in traditionally male industries, such as aircraft and machinery, through seniority systems that favored returning servicemen (Milkman 1987) . But the relative magnitude of those who remained in the labor force and those who exited had previously not been known. Women employed in wartime industries could have been pushed out at the war's conclusion but been reemployed in other sectors, and it is this possibility that has dominated one interpretation of the war's impact. Increased employment of women during the war, according to an extensive literature, greatly affected their employment after. But the data in Table 3 Table 4 is the occupational distribution of those who entered the labor force during the war years. Rosie the Riveter and her fellow workers are apparent in the 37% who were operatives and craft workers in 1944 among those not in the labor force in 1942, a figure that is 10 percentage points higher than among those in the labor force in 1940 and 1950 (column 7).
Also of interest in
In discussing occupational and labor force persistence during the 1940's, one should not forget that there was a substantial shift of workers across industries and often across sectors. Fully 1 in 6 women working in 1944 was in a war-related industry (e.g., fabricated metals, airplane assembly), and even in the Palmer Survey, which includes only those in the The numerator for column (1 in the labor force in 1950, 45% remained in war-related industries (e.g., metals, rubber, chemicals) in 1950 and 66% were in the manufactunng sector in general.
Large differences in the occupational distributions of female workers exist between those who entered in 1944 and those who were employed in 1940 or 1942. New entrants (Table 4, column 4) were far less likely to be in the professional and managerial groups, and more likely to be in the operative and service groups, than those previously employed. The group of wartime entrants who exited the labor force by 1950, as was just demonstrated, were a substantial group. Although there are enough conditional distributions in Table 4 to prove that this group was rather different from those who remained employed, the computation of the precise distribution is complicated. It is likely that 67% of the Rosies who exited at the warps conclusion were operatives and domestics in 1944, a figure substantially higher than that for other groups. Among all new entrants the figure is 55% and among those who remained employed to 1950 it is 47%.
It is even clearer from the bottom portion of Table 5 those not, can be found in Table 5 . The Palmer Survey clearly shows that women employed in 1940 and during any other date in the survey, were considerably more educated and had far fewer children than were those not in the labor force in 1940, but who entered at some subsequent date. There is more than a one-half year difference in education between those who were employed in 1940 and those who were not, twice as many had attended college, and one-third more had graduated high school. Because many of these women's children were If the war had anything to do with these changes it was to rekindle family values in Americans, thus deplete the already reduced labor supply of younger married women, and to restore the full-employment economy, thus to create a demand for older married women.
It has been difficult to isolate the impact of World War II from that of the ending of the Great Depression, but there is mounting evidence from a variety of sources that the war had far less of a direct influence on female labor supply than was believed. The Palmer Survey data have reinforced the conclusions of a growing historical literature that war-time work did not by itself greatly increase women's employment nor advance gender relations in the work place.
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